

Antoine Bouet IFPRI Geneva, September 19th, 2011


- Introductory remarks
 - It is well known that trade distortions are concentrated in the agricultural sector:
 - MAC Maps : une Mesure Bilatérale et Désagrégée de l'Accès au Marché, with L. Fontagné, M. Mimouni and X. Pichot, 2001, *Economie Internationale*, 89-90(1/2): 39-64.
 - Assessing Applied Protection across the World, with Y. Decreux, L. Fontagné, S. Jean and D. Laborde, 2008, Review of International Economics, 16(5), 850-863.
 - WTO is an international public good that supports beneficial trade negotiations
 - Eight Years of Doha Trade Talks: Where Do We Stand?, with D. Laborde, 2010, Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, 11(2): 349-70.
 - More or less Ambition in the Doha Round: Winners and Losers from Trade Liberalization with a Development Perspective, with S. Mevel and D. Orden, 2007, The World Economy, 30(8): 1253-1280.
 - Multilateral Agricultural Trade Liberalization: the Contrasting Fortunes of Developing Countries, with J.-C. Bureau, Y. Decreux and S. Jean, 2005, *The World Economy*, September, 28(9): 1329-1354.
 - ... and prevents the occurrence of trade wars.
 - Assessing the Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round, with D. Laborde, 2010, World Trade Review, 9: 319-351.

- It is less known that export restrictions are very often used by WTO countries and endanger food security, in particular in small net food-importing countries.
 - IFPRI trade economists have raised the alarm during the crisis.
 - IFPRI Director Generals from Joachim Von Braun (April 2008: http://www.ifpri.org/publication/rising-food-prices)
 - ... to Shenggen Fan(June 2011, <u>http://www.ifpri.org/pressrelease/moving-rhetoric-action-priorities-curtail-price-volatility-protect-poor</u>).
 - Food Crisis and Export Taxation: the Cost of Non-Cooperative Trade Policies, with D. Laborde, 2011, Review of World Economics, forthcoming.

- When large countries have an objective of constant food domestic prices, in the event of an increase in world agricultural prices the optimal response is:
 - to decrease import tariffs in net food-importing countries
 - and to increase export tariffs in net food-exporting countries.
- Small countries are harmed by both decisions.

 The costs of a lack of cooperation in and regulation of (binding process) such policies in a time of crisis has been illustrated using a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, mimicking the mechanisms that have appeared during the recent food price surge.

	Average production price	Average trade price					
1 – Exogenous demand increase [initial perturbation]	9.10%	10.8%					
Effects of policy responses							
2 – 1 + Implementation/increase of export taxes to mitigate the shock on domestic prices	1.52%	16.76%					
3 – 1+ Elimination/reduction of import duties to mitigate the shock on domestic prices	9.05%	12.62%					
4 – 1+ Elimination/reduction of import duties and import subsidies to mitigate the shock on domestic prices	20.12%	27.31%					
5 – 2 & 4: Combined non cooperative policies allowing import subsidies	16.00%	41.10%					
6 – 2 & 3: Combined non cooperative policies without import subsidies	7.05%	20.58%					




Protection applied by country

Table 2: Protection applied by country (2001)

	l 1	By sector			By exporter		
	Total	Agric.	Manuf.	Tex-Wea	LdC	Dvping Co. [Ovped Co.
World	5.6%	19.1%	4.2%	10.5%	4.9%	5.3%	5.7%
Argentina	12.6%	12.0%	12.4%	18.3%	7.7%	10.8%	13.1%
Australia	5.1%	2.7%	4.9%	14.2%	7.9%	5.6%	4.9%
Bangladesh	16.9%	20.9%	15.2%	29.7%	16.7%	20.2%	14.8%
Brazil	11.8%	11.0%	11.4%	18.1%	2.4%	9.4%	12.8%
Canada	3.4%	14.9%	2.1%	10.8%	5.8%	3.1%	3.5%
China	14.1%	25.0%	12.7%	20.4%	3.6%	12.9%	14.7%
European Union (15)	3.1%	17.9%	2.0%	5.7%	0.8%	2.7%	3.5%
India	33.5%	59.6%	29.9%	29.5%	28.3%	35.4%	32.5%
Japan	3.9%	35.3%	0.9%	6.8%	1.6%	3.9%	3.9%
Korea	9.2%	53.8%	5.5%	10.3%	10.1%	9.9%	8.9%
Madagascar	4.4%	5.5%	4.1%	4.7%	2.2%	4.6%	4.4%
Mexico	11.0%	28.2%	8.9%	14.5%	15.9%	17.9%	8.9%
Morocco	20.9%	40.1%	17.9%	33.9%	17.4%	25.0%	19.3%
Mozambique	9.9%	13.4%	8.3%	21.6%	10.0%	11.4%	9.1%
South Africa	8.4%	19.2%	6.5%	22.5%	5.8%	10.7%	7.7%
Switzerland	4.3%	43.3%	1.3%	4.0%	0.6%	4.0%	4.5%
Thailand	12.6%	28.0%	10.7%	18.1%	4.4%	12.8%	12.6%
Tunisia	20.3%	53.3%	16.5%	26.0%	9.4%	24.2%	18.9%
Turkey	6.0%	38.0%	2.6%	8.9%	3.3%	9.1%	4.9%
United States of America	2.3%	5.0%	1.7%	9.4%	5.1%	2.4%	2.3%
Vietnam	14.4%	26.0%	11.1%	31.1%	15.0%	16.6%	13.0%

Source: MacMap.


Protection applied by sector – 2007 "updated"





Global results (in volume terms and in \$ billion) led by tariffs and domestic support changes (DDA reform) Change compared to the baseline in 2025


Source: Authors' calculations. MIRAGE simulations.





World Average Tariffs by scenario – 2010

Source: MAcMapHS6v2.1, TRAINS and authors' calculations (reference group weighting scheme).





- Advantages of the multilateral trading system
 - Multilateral lib'n is good for international food security
 - Consolidation of trade policies is good for international food security
- The issue of export restrictions has to be very soon addressed by WTO